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INTRODUCTION 
Appellee/cross-appellant/defendant and third party plaintiff 
Zandra Perkins ("Perkins") hereby files her Reply Brief in Support 
of her Cross Appeal and in Opposition to the Appeal of Plaintiff/ 
Appellee/Cross-Appellant Kent L. Frampton ("Frampton") . This Reply 
Brief contains the following argument sections: 
1. Reply to (a) Appellee Bear River Mutual Insurance 
Company's ("Bear River") brief in opposition to issues raised by 
Perkins in her appeal and (b) to Appellant/Cross-Appellee First 
General Services ("First General Services") brief in opposition to 
issues raised by Perkins in her appeal; and 
2. Perkins's brief in opposition to Frampton7s Appeal. 
I. 
PERKINS'S REPLY TO BEAR RIVER'S AND TO FIRST GENERAL SERVICES'S 
BRIEFS IN OPPOSITION TO ISSUES RAISED BY PERKINS ON APPEAL 
Bear River and First General Services have made essentially 
the same arguments in opposition to Perkins's appeal. Therefore, 
although objections to Bear River's statement of facts and to First 
General Services's statement of facts are set forth separately 
below, Perkins's reply argument is made in response to arguments 
advanced by both parties. 
A. Objections to Bear River's Statement of Facts. 
In 29 numbered paragraphs,1 Bear River sets forth certain 
alleged facts to which Perkins objects on various grounds, 
including Bear River's failure to cite to the record, its 
1
 See Bear River's Brief, pp. 9-21. 
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misstatements of facts, and its recitation of irrelevant facts. 
The numbered paragraphs below correspond to the paragraph numbers 
in Bear River's Brief. 
3. Paragraph 3 recites a number of alleged facts, many 
of which are unsupported by citation to the record and, 
accordingly, should be disregarded by this Court. In addition, 
Bear River's knowledge that Perkins was involved in the "reckless 
burning" of her Hillsden home in 1987 was never taken into account 
in any way during its adjustment of her insurance claim on the May 
1990 Fire at issue in this case. (See Perkins Appellee/Cross-
Appellant Brief, pp. 19-20, ff 11-12). Moreover, the previous fire 
at Perkins's Hillsden home was not an insured event, and Perkins 
made no insurance claim for fire damage (R. 974). 
4. Perkins's inability to file a proof of loss with Bear 
River within 60 days was never an issue in Bear River's adjustment 
of Perkins's claim. Indeed, Bear River granted Perkins an 
extension in which to file the appropriate proof of loss forms. 
Accordingly, the facts set forth in Paragraph 4 are irrelevant to 
the issues now before this Court. 
8. Bear River implies that complaints by Perkins about First 
General's work came about solely because Peterson allegedly refused 
to bill Bear River for uninsurable work. This is not the case. 
(See Perkins Brief, p. 14, f 1). 
9. Bear River contends that Perkins instructed it not to pay 
additional monies to First General Services. This statement is 
incorrect. Rather, Perkins and her sister informed Bear River that 
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it should not pay any contractors without their authorization 
(Perkins Brief, p. 14, fl 2). 
23. Bear River again asserts that Perkins ordered it not to 
pay First General. As noted above, this statement is incorrect. 
B. Objections to First General Services's Statement of 
Facts. 
The numbered paragraphs below correspond to the paragraph 
numbers in First General Services's Reply Brief. 
6. First General Services asserts that it only questioned 
Perkins at trial about the Hillsden Fire because it was attempting 
to elicit relevant information on Perkins's experience in hiring 
contractors and whether she had ever requested a payment bond from 
a contractor. However, this information could have been just as 
easily elicited without mentioning the fact that the prior need to 
hire a contractor was because of fire damage. The specific event 
which necessitated her hiring a contractor, in this instance a 
fire, was irrelevant to the evidence First General Services claims 
it was attempting to elicit from Perkins—whether Perkins had had 
previous experience with contractors. Information regarding such 
experience did not require First General Services's gratuitous 
references to the Hillsden fire. 
C. Evidence of the 1987 Hillsden Fire and the Allegedly 
Suspicious Nature of the May 1990 Fire Should Have Been 
Excluded By the Trial Court As Irrelevant, Prejudicial, 
Misleading and Inflammatory. 
Bear River and First General Services argue that evidence of 
the 1987 Hillsden Fire and of the allegedly suspicious nature of 
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the May 1990 Fire were properly admitted because these facts were 
relevant to Bear River's defense (See Bear River's Appellee Brief, 
pp. 22-26; First General Services Reply Brief, pp. 28-40). In 
support of its position, Bear River asserts that its knowledge of 
the Hillsden fire "could . . . have had an impact upon the manner 
in which Bear River adjusted the May 19, 1990 fire." (Bear River 
Brief, p. 23; emphasis added). It is undisputed, however, that 
this knowledge had no impact at all on the adjustment of Perkins's 
claim. Thus, the evidence of the Hillsden fire, in addition to be 
unfairly prejudicial, was irrelevant. Perkins's arguments in 
opposition to these contentions have been fully set forth in her 
Appellant's Brief (Perkins Brief, pp. 25-33) and will not be 
repeated here. Suffice it to say, the evidence of the Hillsden 
fire and the allegedly suspicious nature of the May 1990 Fire was 
highly inflammatory and prejudicial. It cannot be doubted that the 
introduction of such evidence was for improper purposes—to inflame 
and mislead the jury. 
In further support of its contention that this evidence was 
properly admitted, Bear River points out that other courts 
allegedly faced with the same evidentiary issues have permitted 
introduction of evidence of previous fires to show that the 
insurance company conducted itself in good faith in adjusting the 
insured's claims. These cases are readily distinguishable from the 
case now before this Court. In Pacheco v. Safeco Ins. Co. of 
America, 780 P.2d 116 (Idaho 1989), for example, the insurer 
defended against a bad faith denial of insurance proceeds by 
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contending that the "insured was responsible for intentionally 
setting the fire." Id. at 116-117. The trial court permitted the 
introduction of evidence of an arson investigation of the insured 
following a previous fire. The primary reason for allowing the 
introduction of this evidence was that the insured himself 
introduced this evidence in his case in chief, thereby opening the 
door to the insurer. In contrast, Bear River has never contended— 
as did the insurer in Pacheco—that Perkins intentionally set the 
May 1990 Fire or was responsible in any way for that fire. 
Moreover, Perkins strenuously objected to the introduction of 
evidence of the Hillsden fire and of the allegedly suspicious 
nature of the May 1990 Fire. 
Bear River also relies on Rutledge v. St. Paul and Marine Ins. 
Co.. 334 S.E.2d 131 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985). It, too, is 
unpersuasive. In Rutledge, the trial court would not permit the 
introduction of evidence by the insurance company that the insured 
suffered a loss due to fire approximately one year before 
sustaining the fire loss at issue. Significantly, the insured 
collected fire insurance proceeds on the prior loss. The South 
Carolina Court of Appeals ruled that the trial judge committed 
reversible error in light of the insurer's defense that Rutledge 
intentionally caused the fire at issue. In contrast to Rutledge, 
Perkins never collected or attempted to collect insurance proceeds 
for the Hillsden fire. In addition, Bear River never claimed that 
Perkins was responsible in any way for the May 1990 Fire. Indeed, 
the issue of how the May 1990 Fire started or who started it played 
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no role in Bear River's adjustment of the claim. (See Perkins 
Brief, pp. 18-22, ffl 9-13). 
Bear River and First General Services further argue that 
because the trial court limited the introduction of evidence 
regarding the 1987 Hillsden fire and evidence as to who may have 
set the May 1990 Fire, this evidence could only have had a 
negligible effect, if any, on the jury's decision. To the 
contrary, admission of this limited evidence regarding the Hillsden 
fire and the May 1990 Fire may have done more harm than if the two 
issues had been fully explored. Because of the trial court's 
evidentiary rulings permitting the admission of unexplained 
references to the allegedly suspicious nature of the May 1990 Fire 
and to Perkins's role in the Hillsden fire, jury members were left 
to speculate freely. As a result, the jury could have easily, but 
incorrectly, concluded that Perkins was responsible for setting 
both the Hillsden fire and the May 1990 Fire in order to collect 
insurance proceeds. 
Finally, Bear River and First General Services disingenuously 
argue that the probative value of evidence of the Hillsden fire and 
the fact that the May 1990 Fire may have been intentionally set far 
outweighs any prejudicial effect to Perkins. After all, according 
to Bear River, the trial court precluded evidence as to who may 
have set the May 1990 Fire and the jury was only permitted to know 
that the fire was suspicious and intentionally set (Bear River 
Brief, pp. 28-29). The effect of this "limited" evidence on the 
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jury is readily palpable: the jury could reach but one conclusion, 
namely, that Perkins herself set the May 1990 Fire. 
D. Perkins Preserved the Issue of Whether the Trial Court 
Erred in Allowing Bear River's Counsel to Improperly 
Imply that Insurance Fraud Was an Issue. 
Bear River contends that Perkins waived any right to appeal 
the issue of "insurance fraud" because Perkins's counsel improperly 
stated his motion for mistrial when he objected to the numerous 
references to fraud in Bear River's opening argument. Bear River's 
characterization of the discussion between the court and counsel, 
however, is misleading. Perkins's counsel, Mr. Campbell, objected 
to Bear River's counsel's (Mr. Heath) use of the terms "fraud," 
"defraud the insurance company," "fraudulent," and "real fraud" 
during opening argument (See Perkins Brief, pp. 3-4, 15-18). The 
basis for this objection was that insurance fraud was never raised 
as an issue in the case. Because Mr. Heath improperly raised the 
issue of insurance fraud, Mr. Campbell made the following statement 
in chambers: "I therefore stand on the motion, your honor, for 
mistrial, or in the alternative to admonish the jury" (R. 5332) . 
The court responded to Mr. Campbell's motion for mistrial by 
stating: "The court will deny the motion for mistrial" (R. 5332). 
As stated by this Court in Salt Lake City v. Holtman, 806 P. 2d 
235, 237 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), "when an issue is argued before the 
court and the court makes a definitive ruling . . . the issue is 
adequately preserved for appeal." Here, Mr. Campbell explicitly 
moved for mistrial because of Mr. Heath's improper references in 
opening argument to insurance fraud and fraudulent claims. The 
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court, by denying the motion for mistrial, made a definitive 
ruling. Thus, the issue of whether the court erred by failing to 
grant the motion for mistrial was adequately preserved for appeal. 
E. Conclusion. 
Opposing counsels' repeated references during opening argument 
and throughout the trial to fraud, fraudulent conduct, insurance 
fraud, the suspicious nature of the May 1990 Fire and the 
possibility that the May 1990 Fire was intentionally set were 
clearly improper and served no purpose except to unjustly prejudice 
the jurors against Perkins. These remarks fall well within the 
definition of improper statements, that is, statements "plainly 
designed to elicit sympathy or to inspire passion or prejudice" in 
the minds of the jury. Moreover, the cumulative effect of allowing 
opposing counsel to repeatedly make such remarks was to 
continuously remind the jury of inflammatory evidence, evidence 
that was irrelevant to issues which were properly before the jury. 
Because of the cumulative error in evidentiary rulings, a verdict 
against Perkins was virtually preordained. Accordingly, this case 
should be remanded to the trial court for a new trial. 
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II. 
ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION TO FRAMPTON'S 
APPEAL OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AWARD 
A. Introduction,2 
Frampton filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to foreclose his 
mechanics' lien against First General and Perkins (R. 390-393). 
The trial court granted Frampton7s Motion and awarded $426.21, plus 
attorneys' fees of $4,557.00, pursuant to Utah's Mechanics' Lien 
Statute (R. 1856, 1858), in favor of Frampton and against both 
First General and Perkins.3 Because Perkins had asserted a 
counterclaim against Frampton for water damages resulting from 
Frampton's negligent installation of a swamp cooler, the court 
stayed collection by Frampton of the judgment and fee award, 
pending resolution of Perkins's negligence claims against Frampton 
at trial (R. 813, 886-891, 114-118, 1196-1199, 1859). During 
trial, the court dismissed Perkins's claims against Frampton (R. 
1291). Frampton then filed a motion for additional attorneys' fees 
incurred through trial, seeking a total of $9,464.42 in attorneys' 
fees (R. 1309, 1320). The court denied Frampton's motion for 
2
 Frampton has misstated the standard of review with respect 
to a trial court's determination of the reasonableness of an award 
of attorneys' fees. As stated by this Court in Govert Copier 
Painting v. Van Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163, 173 (Utah Ct. App. 1990): 
"As a general rule, the trial court has discretion to determine the 
reasonable attorney fees to be awarded and 'we will not overturn 
the award absent an abuse of discretion.' Regional Sales Agency, 
Inc. v. Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210, 1215 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) . . . ,f 
See also, Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 
1988). 
3
 The Affidavit upon which the award of $4,557.00 is based is 
found at R. 811-885. It does not allocate fees between those 
incurred to enforce the mechanics' lien and those incurred in 
defending Perkins's counterclaim for negligence. 
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additional attorneys' fees at a post trial hearing on August 5, 
1993 (R. 5163-5166) and ordered First General to pay the judgment 
in favor of Frampton in the amount of $426.21 plus $4,582.00 for 
attorneys' fees (R. 1776). 
Frampton now appeals the trial court's decision not to award 
additional attorneys' fees. The basis for Frampton's assertion 
that the trial court erred in denying his request for additional 
attorneys' fees is two-fold: (1) that attorneys' fees and costs 
incurred by Frampton in foreclosing his mechanics' lien and in 
defending against Perkins's counterclaim for negligence were 
"reasonable;" and (2) that Utah's Mechanics' Lien Statute—which 
allows an award of attorneys' fees for enforcement of the lien— 
should be construed to permit an award of all attorneys' fees 
incurred in litigation, including those which have nothing to do 
with enforcement of the mechanics' lien itself. Frampton's logic 
is flawed. 
Frampton first argues that total attorneys' fees of $9,464.42 
incurred in foreclosure of the mechanics' lien and in defense of 
Perkins's counterclaim were "reasonable," and on this basis alone, 
he is entitled to have all his "reasonable" fees paid by Perkins 
and/or First General. It is axiomatic that any award of attorneys' 
fees must be reasonable and must be based on evidence in the 
record, irrespective of the basis for the award. Govert Copier 
Painting v. Van Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163, 173 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Frampton's argument, however, puts the cart before the horse. 
Before determining the reasonableness of the fees requested, the 
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trial court must first determine which of the fees incurred are 
recoverable under Utah law, that is, which fees were expended on 
successful claims for which there is an entitlement to attorneys' 
fees. Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine. 830 P.2d 266, 269 (Utah 1992). 
B. Frampton is Entitled Only To Fees and Costs Incurred in 
Foreclosing His Mechanics' Lien. 
Under Utah law, attorneys' fees may only be award if provided 
for by statute or by contract.4 The Utah Supreme Court, in Utah 
Farm Production Credit Assoc, v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62, 66 (Utah 1981), 
held that: 
[a] party is therefore entitled only to those fees 
resulting from its principle cause of action for 
which there is a contractual (or statutory) 
obligation for attorneys' fees. (Emphasis added). 
Utah's Mechanics' Lien Statute provides in pertinent part as 
follow: 
In any action brought to enforce any lien under 
this Chapter the successful party shall be entitled 
to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed 
by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the 
action. (Emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18. 
4
 Perkins previously set forth her argument regarding those 
circumstances where a court may award attorneys' fees and cost, 
namely, in cases where an award is permitted by statute or pursuant 
to contract terms. The award of attorneys' fees by a court for 
which there is a contractual or statutory obligation will not be 
repeated here (See Perkins Brief, pp. 38-42). In addition, 
Perkins, in opposing First General Services's appeal for additional 
attorneys' fees, has already presented her argument regarding the 
trial court's discretion in determining whether fees are 
"reasonable" (Perkins Brief, pp. 42-47). Again, Perkins will not 
repeat the argument here except to point out that the same 
reasoning applies to Frampton's claim that he is entitled to over 
$9,000 in attorneys' fees. 
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Where, as here, a fee may be awarded pursuant to the 
Mechanics' Lien Statute, the fee award is limited to fees expended 
to enforce the lienholder's rights. Moreover, the Utah Supreme 
Court has made it clear that the plaintiff in a foreclosure action 
must allocate fees between those for which he is entitled to 
reimbursement pursuant to statute and those incurred on work not 
subject to a fee award. Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P. 2d 168 (Utah 
1977); Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d at 269. A plaintiff 
cannot recover fees expended in defending a counterclaim in an 
action to foreclose a lien and, indeed, is entitled to no fees at 
all where plaintiff fails to "provide enough proof to enable the 
court to distinguish the portion of plaintiff's fees spent in 
prosecuting the complaint from the portion spent in defending the 
counterclaim." Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n, 657 
P.2d 1279, 1288 (Utah 1982), relying upon Utah Farm Production 
Credit Ass'n v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62 (Utah 1981). This Court should 
hold that the trial court erred when it failed to award Frampton 
only fees and costs directly attributable to those expended to 
enforce his lienholder's rights pursuant to the Mechanic's Lien 
Statute. 
C. The Award of Attorneys' Fees Under the Mechanics' Lien 
Statute Is Narrowly Construed. 
Frampton attempts to argue that the Mechanics' Lien Statute 
permits a lienholder to collect not only attorneys' fees incurred 
in enforcing a lien but, in addition, any fees incurred in 
successfully defending against counterclaims. Frampton asserts 
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that such an interpretation of Section 38-1-18 is supported by the 
Utah Supreme Court's decision in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 
P.2d 985 (Utah 1988). Frampton's reliance is misplaced. Dixie 
State Bank involved the award of attorneys' fees pursuant to a 
provision found in a note and security agreement. Dixie State Bank 
is distinguishable from the case now before this Court because the 
contractual provision for attorneys' fees at issue in Dixie State 
Bank was much broader than that found the in the Mechanics' Lien 
Statute. 
As this Court recognized in Rotta v. Hawk. 756 P.2d 713, 716 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), Section 38-1-18 of the Mechanics' Lien 
Statute must be narrowly interpreted to include only those fees 
arising from the lien foreclosure action itself. This 
interpretation comports with the Utah Supreme Court's holding in 
Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266 (Utah 1992): 
One who seeks an award of attorney fees must set 
out the time and fees expended for (1) successful 
claims for which there may be an entitlement to 
attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for which 
there would have been an entitlement to attorney 
fees had the claims been successful, and (3) claims 
for which there is no entitlement to attorney fees. 
Id. at 269-270. 
This Court should uphold the trial court's award of $4,557.00 
in attorneys' fees as "reasonable." In the alternative, the Court 
should remand this case to the trial court so that it may determine 
whether Frampton provided sufficient evidence to allow the trial 
court to determine those fees associated with foreclosure of 
- 13 -
Frampton's lien from other fees for which Frampton is not entitled 
to an award. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing argument and on the arguments set forth 
in Perkins's Appellant Brief, this Court should remand the case to 
the trial court and order a new trial because of evidentiary errors 
committed in the previous trial. In addition, this Court should 
hold that First General Services is not entitled to any award of 
fees and costs because it did not meet its burden of apportioning 
such costs and fees and, further, that the trial court properly 
held that First General Services is liable for satisfying 
Frampton's judgment, including, an appropriate award of attorneys' 
fees. 
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